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The Vagaries of Illinois Supreme Court Rule

103(b) Revisited
Robert G. Johnston and Iain D. Johnston
Editor's Note: Last year, an article entitled The Vagaries of
Rule 103(b) by Robert G. and lain D. Johnston appeared in the
Judicial Conference Symposium issue of the Journal. The title of
the article was erroneously shortened without the authors' consent
and the article was published without giving the authors an opportunity to update its content. The following brief update has been
provided by the authors to correct these oversights.
Since The Vagaries of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 103(b) I was
first submitted for publication, the Illinois Supreme Court decided
two cases discussing application of the rule. In Segal v. Sacco,2
both the appellate3 and supreme courts found that the trial court
abused its discretion in granting defendant's rule 103(b) motion.
In its analysis, the supreme court warned that dismissal of a cause
of action with prejudice under rule 103(b) is a harsh penalty. That
penalty, the court stated, is justified when a delay in service of process denies a defendant a fair opportunity to investigate accessible
information upon which liability is predicated.4 The court in Segal
determined that the length of delay in service of process did not
threaten the trial court's ability to proceed expeditiously to a resolution of the matter before it. Accordingly, the supreme court concluded that granting defendant's rule 103(b) motion was an abuse
of the trial court's discretion.5 The court noted, however, that the
length of the delay was not the determinative issue, thereby rejecting the appellate court's analysis in this regard.6
In Womick v. Jackson County Nursing Home,' the supreme
1. Johnston & Johnston, The Vagaries of Rule 103(b), 21 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 831
(1990). Although the views expressed therein are those of the authors, they would like to
thank the Honorable Thomas E. Hoffman for his assistance with the Article.
2. 136 Ill. 2d 282, 555 N.E.2d 719 (1990).
3. For a discussion of the appellate court's decision, see Johnston & Johnston, supra
note 1, at 835.
4. Segal, 136 Ill. 2d at 288, 555 N.E.2d at 721.
5. Id. at 289, 555 N.E.2d at 721.
6. Id.
7. 137 Ill. 2d 371, 561 N.E.2d 25 (1990).
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court found that plaintiff failed to use reasonable diligence in obtaining service of process. The court explained:
In the present case, we similarly find no evidence of diligence in
effectuating service. Womick made no attempt to place summons for a period of almost nine months after the expiration of
the statute of limitations, and has offered no explanation for this
inactivity. There is no question that he knew how to locate the
nursing home: the fact that service was effectuated in only one
day reflects the ease with which service of summons could have
been had. While it is true that the nursing home had notice of
the lawsuit in the present case, that notice is not sufficient to preclude dismissal in light of Womick's obvious lack of diligence.'
Thus, actual knowledge, although a factor in determining reasonable diligence, is not determinative under the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.9

8. Id. at 380-81, 561 N.E.2d at 29.
9. See Johnston & Johnston, supra note 1, at 841.

